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“Of the plausible scenarios for China's future, the possibility of a new constitutionalism 
has been taken seriously by only a few Western specialists. Yet the constitutionalist 
scenario gains credibility from the improbability of the alternatives”, argued Andrew 
Nathan as early as 1995 under a title at that time quite avant-gardiste: China’s 
Constitutionalist Option.1 Ten years later, notwithstanding the ups and downs in the 
political and legal evolutions of China, that “option” seems even more credible. Indeed, 
constitutionalism rather than democracy looks like the rather consensual and efficient 
paths for China to go on. The PRC seems thus to have embarked on a path which is 
both traditional (democracy after the Rule of Law is the rule rather than the exception, 
and corresponds to the patterns of European history among others) and unusual (that of 
an evolving constitutionalism without a system of "State of Parties" (the German concept 
of "Parteienstaat") or political pluralism.  
To begin with, the paper argues that one must consider the history of constitutional 
development in China in the long run. We hereby mean, firstly, the fact that constitutional 
                                                 
1  Journal of Democracy, 7.4 (1996) 43-57 
                                                                                        
legacy dates back to the end of the 19th century but also that it remains hardly “workable” 
or “usable” in the PRC as it still symbolizes both the dictatorial powers of Yuan Shikai 
and Jiang Jieshi and nowadays the democratization of Taiwan which was lead possible 
thanks to the 1946 constitution enacted on the mainland. Secondly, the recent historical 
transformations of socialist countries must also be considered when analyzing China’s 
constitutional evolutions. Indeed, China has embarked in legal reforms 10 years before 
the rest of the socialist countries but remain today far behind them in terms of 
constitutional justice. Yet, comparatively, most of the Easter European countries had, 
before the Communism, an experience of constitutional democracy that China never fully 
experienced: for example, Czechoslovakia had a Constitutional Court after the First 
World War. At last, contemporary worldwide neo-constitutional movement is growingly 
based and intertwined with general global concepts such as good governance. 
Considering the fact that current official discourse in China on Rule of law shares similar 
references with international discourses, the question is whether the PRC is truly 
engaged in a 18th century type of constitutionalist movement or whether it is limited to a 
tool to prevent political and institutional reforms from its original socialist framework.  
Leaving the historical perspective, the paper will also argue that two different kinds of 
constitutionalism exist in today China: an “official” one and one “popular” (minjian) or 
civil-society based. Popular constitutionalism embodies a true “rights movement” (locally 
labeled “defense of rights” movement- weiquan yundong, 维权运动) which progressively, 
cases after cases, evolves towards a movement for the protection of constitutional rights. 
Nonetheless, and more interestingly so, both official and non-official constitutionalist 
movements are intertwined. A clear distinction can not easily be drawn between the two 
spheres (public and private or, more precisely, non official) as both types of 
constitutional activisms interact each other constantly. For instance, academic or 
professional based constitutional actions reflect both the Party-State and the civil society 
domain. Officially also, a constitutionalist movement exists in a sense that, besides the 
existence of the CCP Charter, the State Constitution becomes an important site of 
political and social debate and contestations. Thus and secondly, analyzing the most 
recent constitutional amendments of 1999 and 2004 on the light of constitutional law 
theory, we will argue that the State Constitution of the PRC seems to be growingly taken 
seriously.  
The hypothesis we work on is that China does not seem to be an anomalous paradigm 
of transition to constitutionalism but rather a classic one. Its model and development 
Stéphanie Balme and Pasquale Pasquino - Taking Constitution(alism) seriously? … - January 2006 
http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org 
2
better describe the 18th century view of the relations between constitutional and political 
changes, according to which constitutionalism is a precondition to democracy and not 
vice versa. Therefore, we need not to focus on the nowadays standard relation between 
constitutionalism and democracy, but on the dynamics between constitutionalism and 
politico-institutional changes if not democratization.   
As other countries of different waves of constitutionalism did previously, China needs to 
go through a Copernican revolutions in order to define, first, what is law and the sources 
of law and reconsider the institutional paradigm of parliament sovereignty ; second, to 
reject the traditional Chinese distrust of judges and, third, the distrust of non official 
intermediaries located between individuals and the State power. The traditional 
preference for direct interactions between political power and individuals (society) needs 
to evolve. For China, constitutionalism is challenging as its philosophy is to prevent 
excessive centralization of power. Nonetheless, this trend has proven to be reinforced in 
China constantly besides or thanks to the modernization and opening policies. 
 
Recent constitutional activism: political and historical contexts   
 
China benefits of a rather rich historical constitutional heritage. Indeed, the country has 
been involved in the worldwide second wave of constitutional movement that has 
influenced Europe, Americas and non-western systems such as Japan from the end of 
the 19th century to the beginning of Second World War. At the time of Sun Yatsen’s 
political ideals, intellectual and political movements in China developed accordingly with 
Japanese constitutional reflections (especially during the 1860-1880’s generation) and 
European (in particular 1910-1930) theories on the Rule of law2. H. Kelsen's main work, 
the Reine Rechtslehre (Pure Theory of Law), along with other intellectual movements 
known as “Vienna circles”, were influential in this part of the world. At that time, the 
current alleged inevitable distinction between the path of reforms according to the 
European law theory and the constitutional developments in China would have been 
perceived as a mere abstraction. Sun Yatsen’s “san min zhuyi” (Three people’s 
principles三民主义), later embodied in the 1946 Constitution, were constitutionally 
articulated and politically conceived as a Chinese innovation of Montesquieu’s 
“separation of powers”. Until the 1940s, Chinese political and legal theory were 
                                                 
2 Iyenaga, Toyokichi, 2004, The Constitutional Development of Japan 1863-1881 
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sometimes even more sophisticated than some of European countries, such as Spain or 
Portugal for instance which now count as strong constitutional democracies.  
If we follow Zhang Xueren et Chen Ningsheng, philosopher and historian of law at 
Wuhan University3, the last 100 years of Chinese history has been dominated by 3 
important yet insufficient evolutions which can easily be summarized by a “language 
revolution”, as often in the Chinese context, meaning by the replacement of 3 ideograms 
in key political expressions. They are: (1) the path from the mere discovery of the 
concept of “Constitution, 宪法“ (from the end of 19th century to the establishment of the 
Republic in 1912) to the one of “constitutional government, 宪政”; (2) the evolution from 
the Rule by man (人治) to the Rule by law (法制) and, at last, to the Rule of law (法治) ; 
(3) the evolution from the notion of vassal, subordinated subjects (臣民) to the notion of 
“subject-citizen” (国民). Such trends are effective transformations inside the Chinese 
political system as well as for its nation-state building process. Yet, the early quest for a 
modern, opened, pluralistic and yet truly Chinese political system remains a battle that is 
only at its beginning. Therefore, China which has participated officially to the 
international second wave of constitutionalism in the first third of the 20th century was 
never part of the third wave which acknowledged, after 1945 and again with the collapse 
of the communist block in 1989, the worldwide acceptance of democracy. 
The characteristics of the Chinese constitutional movement are not mainly determined 
by so-called specific cultural dimensions but rather by specific historical features. Among 
them is the circumstance that in China each single element of a system based on rule of 
law has to be reformed or (re)invented ad hoc and at the same time the fact that each 
constitutional needed “block” to build a rule of law system must be in China reformed or 
(re)invented ad hoc and at a simultaneous pace. For example, in most European 
countries, including France, the codification of laws has been one of the main political 
tasks of the 19th century. At that time, legal professionals were trained in law and 
tradition of law faculties was very vivid. (even if the first chair of constitutional law was 
only created in France in 1831 by Guizot at the Collège de France for Pellegrino Rossi 
and did not last longtime). In China, legal agenda must concentrate all type of these 
different reforms at the same time: from the national unified examination for judges and 
lawyers (the first one occurred in March 2002) to the writing of a Civil Code 
                                                 
3 Zhang Xueren et Chen Ningsheng (dir.), Ershi shiji zhi zhongguo xianzheng, Le Constitutionnalisme de la 
Chine au XXème siècle, Wuhan daxue chubanshe, Wuhan, 2002, 497p. 
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(法典expected for 2010) and the formalization of a hierarchy of norms (法律等级) as well 
as a system of constitutional adjudication（违宪审查制度）. Another difference with 
former communist countries lies in the fact that the American constitutionalist model 
seems to be the reference for Chinese changes where, in former communist Europe, the 
legal heritage being essentially the European one, the main debate was basically to 
choose between the French or the German model. In the case of China, the question 
doesn’t seem to be how the political constitutional engineering affects the transition to 
democracy and its consolidation but how the current constitutionalist movement can 
affect a political regime, which refuses at this stage a democratic transition? Can a post-
authoritarian system emerge from the conjunction of economic capitalist development 
and a thin form of rule of law? And whether such a post- or quasi-authoritarian regime 
emerges, how far can it go? 
 
Constitutionalism, Rule of law and good governance: interacting paradigms 
 
Taken separately constitutionalism, rule of law and democracy are clear concepts, 
traditionally analyzed by political theory as well as legal philosophy. Yet, having 
complicated interactions (for instance, constitutional adjudication has long been 
suspects to democrats and it is hard to justify its necessity in terms of democratic theory) 
or even contradictory objectives, their meanings tend to be blurred. Besides, there is not 
but one Rule of law system or one type of democracy. The formation of constitutionalism 
in Europe and in the US from the 18th Century gave birth to two sisters traditions, sisters 
which are not twins! The American constitutional tradition has been inspired by the 
French political theorist Montesquieu, who praised himself English philosophers who had 
structured his own thought, and even more the English customary constitution. 
In the last 25 years, the word “democracy” became mostly in the common (journalistic) 
language of the western societies a synonym of “good government”, without any other 
conceptual specification. It seems, nonetheless, more rigorous to use that word to qualify 
a political system based on “repeated free elections”, and as a mechanism to allocate 
peacefully governmental power among competing elites (essentially a Schumpeter’s 
definition). We now tend to forget that such a mechanism, democracy, presupposes the 
existence of a plurality of organized political actors (parties) who have some reasons to 
move from an open violent conflict to a battle fought with “paper stones” (an eloquent 
expression borrowed to A. Przeworski). Such a condition, the existence of a plurality of 
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politically organized forces, and as such “democracy” in the Schumpeterian sense 
doesn’t seem for the time being a possible “option” for China. Therefore, the following 
question is to inquire what are the reasons, if any, to believe that “constitutionalism” is an 
option on the table. To better respond to this question, one needs to add something 
about democracy and elections. The fact that elections are a mechanism to assign 
political power to competing elites hasn’t been in history the only reason to resort to 
them. In societies, like for instance France during the Revolution, which did not accept 
organized political pluralism, elections had an independent double function: 1) to 
attribute legitimacy to those who govern4 (establishing, by the same token, the obligation 
of the citizens to obey the elected officials as argued by Emmanuel Sieyes during the 
French Revolution), and 2) to introduce – vis-à-vis the monarchical or dictatorial regime 
– the practice of a limited government, given that those who govern have no “tenure”, so 
that the government is limited over time, and those in power need to be reelected if they 
want to stay in office.5 We here suggest that elections and representative government 
(institutions that we have named later on “democratic” ones) have a strong connection 
with constitutionalism – if we understand by it a “limited government”; more exactly they 
are an instrument to achieve that goal. If elections and democracy are a means and not 
an end, if accordingly we make these democratic institutions function of a superior goal, 
we suggest by the same token that there are possibly alternative paths or means to 
achieve the goal of an anti-despotic, or limited government. Constitutionalism, here in 
the sense of some form of separation of powers, seems to be a major alternative to 
achieve that goal. An alternative, which actually had been chosen by most of the 
European continent long before entering the path of a pluralistic “democracy”. 6  
 
By constitutionalism, one must also mean the existence of a set of norms (normally 
codified in a written text) that citizens expect political actors will respect in order to 
govern the country in a non-arbitrary way and that in fact the latter basically respect. 
Independently from (and next to) free elections, the main instrument that allows 
constitutionalism (the same here, as we said, that limited, moderate government)7 to 
                                                 
4 One has to be aware that a revolutionary ideology, for a while, and steep economic growth may be 
alternative mechanisms for political legitimacy of the government. It is interesting, moreover, to notice that 
“socialist” and some others authoritarian regimes prefer fake elections to no elections at all!    
5 Which, needless to say, presupposes real and free elections.  
6 The English case is slightly different, but also in England the early forms of “constitutionalism”, in the 
Middle Age, predate the establishment of a regular two parties system [see Deborah Boucoyannis] 
7 So the word designate at the same time the means (separation of powers) and the aim (limited 
government)!  
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exist and survive goes, since the 18th century and the article 16 of the Declaration of 
Rights, under the name of “separation of powers”. An elected, accountable Parliament 
was able to balance an hereditary king (or an elected president in the American 
republican version of the story) and, vice versa, the king (or the President), because of 
his prestige (see Benjamin Constant on “pouvoir neutre”) and a veto power, was able to 
avoid the exorbitant power resulting from a government by a single assembly 
(gouvernement d’assemblée). This elegant structure, which in different forms is the 
masterpiece of the American as well as of the first French constitution (1791), looses 
much, not to say all, of its grip in contemporary parliamentary regimes (or in the States 
under “united government”), which are moreover Parteinstaaten (political systems 
dominated by organized parties). The reason is pretty intuitive: since the executive lacks 
independence, because of the principle of political responsibility vis-à-vis the Parliament, 
the same political party or the same political majority are in control of the two major 
branches of the government: the legislative and the executive. This is indeed one of the 
main reasons why contemporary constitutionalism – the one established in Europe in 
successive waves after the Second World War – is based essentially on the crucial role 
of an independent judiciary and on judicial organs in charge of constitutional control of 
statute laws and (sometimes) of the acts of the administration.  
The complex structure of the new constitutional-democratic regimes produced a “new 
constitutionalism” characterized by the generalization of mechanisms of constitutional 
adjudication, presidentialization of executive power (American influence), rationalized 
parliamentary institutions and supranational courts (European influence). Nowadays, a 
fundamental shift in democratic practice is that democracy is no longer limited to 
competitive repeated elections, since constitutional adjudication has gained a normative 
legitimacy even in France, a country of a longstanding tradition of distrust of judges.  
We now assume that elections alone cannot be considered as a sufficient guarantee for 
constitutional-democracy; providing a mechanism of constitutional adjudication is now a 
requirement even for countries where it was anathema or even taboo8. Indeed, 95% of 
the countries of the 3rd wave of democratization and constitution making9, especially 
former communist countries have adopted between 1991 and 1996 a judicial review or 
constitutional adjudication mechanism, and for the majority the centralized system of a 
                                                 
8 Democracy and the rule of law by Adam Przeworski, J M Maravall and Pasquino, 2003 
9 Tom Ginsburg, 2005.  
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special court according to the European, Kelsenian, Continental model. In these cases, 
constitutional adjudication was basically the product of democratization.  
 
The definitions of some theorists (Henkin and others 1992) according to which 
constitutionalism is equivalent to democracy has been echoed by the literature on 
political and democratic transition after the third and fourth wave democratization 
countries10. Nonetheless, there is actually no definite sequence between democratization 
and constitutionalism, scholars have long ignored the interactions between 
constitutionalism and the paradigm of the democratization, i.e. the transition to 
democracy. Some particularities of the Chinese constitutionalist movements indicate a 
possibility of rule of law preceding democratization with a particular constitutionalist 
model. As such China better describes the 18th century view of the relations between 
constitutional and political changes, by which we mean that constitutionalism might be a 
precondition for democracy rather than vice versa.  
 
Popular and Official constitutionalism in China: similar dynamics?  
 
On the aftermath of constitutional amendments adopted in March 2004 by China’s 10th 
National People’s Congress, various forums, Internet chats welcomed remarks from 
ordinary citizens on the event. The very official Xinhua Forum printed popular advocacy 
in favor of constitutionalism showing the high level of consciousness of educated urban 
(basically) as well as the official support of such claims. Numerous messages would 
indicate for instance that “the authority of the Constitution can only be maintained in a 
constitutional system” or “only when the provisions of the Constitution are object of 
judicial litigation can its provisions have any substance” etc11. A constitutionalist 
movement exists in a sense that, notwithstanding the existence of the CCP Charter, the 
State Constitution becomes an important locus of political and social contestations.  
As Juan Linz showed in a pioneer book in 1978, The Breakdown of Democratic 
Regimes, political life is not simply divided between the ones who are in favor of 
changes and democracy and the others who are in favor of conservatism and 
dictatorship. It is a more subtle process, a combination of official and “non official” 
spheres. Indeed, one can observe in China since the mid 1990’s the vitality of a truly 
                                                 
10 Linz and Stepan, 1996. 
11新华论坛, www.forum.xinhuanet.com  
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constitutionalist movement embodied by different representatives and strata of the “non 
official spheres“ society as well as by official channels.  
As more new laws and regulations are being promulgated in China by governments at all 
levels, the amount of conflict and inconsistencies between local and national legislation 
have also increased considerably. Briefly, the main characteristics of this unofficial 
constitutionalism are as follow:  
1- less and less isolated cases and, on the contrary, more sophisticated claim against 
State institutional irrationality or brutality as well as increasing collective litigations 
2- a growingly active public opinion, lobbying on related constitutional matters. Young 
legal professionals, media (radio, journals and TV shows specialized on law and 
broadcast trials) and ordinary citizens are the most involved (see for instance the TV’ 
series “ 走向共和” among others); even if the surveys tend to show that awareness and 
knowledge of the Constitution are virtually nil, both among citizens12 (any comparative 
analysis, however, would show similar results, even in democratic regimes, with the 
probable exception of the United States) and among the legal professions or 
government officials. More precisely, if general knowledge about the law is increasing, 
the Constitution is still perceived as "a purely political document" and constitutional law 
remains marginal, almost irrelevant law. It is neither the noble material nor an essential 
resource of the know-how of leadership elites, as is the case in the West.  
3- Both the legal activists, ordinary citizens who go to courts, and active judges’ 
incentives are growingly sophisticated  
4- to some extent it is possible to detect various forms of “legal dissent”, by legal 
professionals (lawyers such as Xu Zhiyong, Li Subin or Li Fangping for examples13), law 
students, activists in local people’s congresses and judges, i.e. those who are in a 
position to address the core contradictions of the political system. The expression 
“judicialisation” (sifa hua) became recently a rather common word. It refers to the political 
uses of the law, the legal uses of the institutional reforms and the self-justification by the 
law of the authoritarian practices of the government but also the increasing influence of 
legal institutions in constitutional practice, as in the expression "judicialisation of the 
Constitution (xianfa de sifahua). The expression “judicial power-grabbing” (司法抢滩)14 is 
                                                 
12 Zhongguo gongmin xianfa yizhi jiaocha baogao, publication dans Zhengfa luntan, juin 2002. The main 
findings are also available on http://www.calaw.cn/include/shownews.asp, 18p, as carried out by Han 
Dayuan and Wang Dezhi.  
13  
14 See Balme, 2005, Judicialisation of politics and politisation of the judiciary in China.  
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nascent. Thus, constitutionalism appears clearly for what it stands: not purely an 
academic subject but a key political and social issue.  
5- Medias are all entirely under official/party control but tend to express provocative 
opinion although amidst high constraints and pressures. Good law reports can be found 
in “21世纪经济报道”, China Youth Daily《中国青年报》, The New Beijing 
Daily《新京报》, Internet chats. Yet, media coverage of legal cases can be, as 
elsewhere in the world, controversial.  
6- It is a true “rights movement” as its Chinese name indicated (rights protection 
movement), which evolve growingly towards a constitutional rights movement as the 
pervasive Chinese expression indicates it: “以宪法维权…”. Today, the most invoked 
articles are the right to equity and equal protection (as stipulated in article 33, 
paragraphe2 of the 1982 Constitution: “all citizens of the PRC are equal before the law”) 
and the protection of property rights. Moreover since the SARS crisis in the Spring of 
2003, the demand of citizens that their fundamental right to information be respected is 
increasing. 
7- Administrative litigation plays the substitute role of the de facto inexistence of 
constitutional adjudication. Although a popular consensus exists and there is an elite 
based social demand for the instauration of a mechanism to protect constitutional rights 
vis-à-vis unconstitutional laws. As a result, more administrative adjudication litigation 
(行政诉讼案) are being brought by citizens seeking to reverse government actions based 
on local regulations that conflict with national laws. However, under China’s 
Administrative Adjudication Law《行政诉讼法》(1990) pursuant to which these suits 
were filed, judicial review is limited to “concrete administrative action” (具体行政行为) 
and does not reach “abstract administrative action” (抽象行政行为). 
In brief, the 2 following changes are the most important:  
- the appropriation by a specialized elite of judicial reforms and institutional changes 
- the progressive disconnection of the legal (and as such the “autonomization”) reform 
from the others reforms, especially the economically oriented ones. Concretely, most of 
current reforms observed in China are the same as the ones observed in Eastern 
Europe from the 1980’s to the 1990s : a process of constitutionalisation of the rights 
movement, judicial reforms, heated debates on the preservation of supposedly socialist 
characteristics, rebirth of constitutional law and professionalization of legal experts.  
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Official constitutionalism: “rigidity' of an unilateral constitution 
 
Constitutional rigidity is written in the PRC Constitution (art. 64) [Article 5 spells out 
moreover the principle of superiority: "No law or administrative or local regulation may 
contravene the Constitution"]. It is true that this same rigidity is or maybe nullified by the 
fact that the CCP controls both the legislative majority and the supermajority needed to 
modify the constitution; but progressively this norm is being imposed on the CCP. In a 
"unilateral constitution”15 like the Chinese one, constitutional amendments are not de 
facto more difficult to enact than ordinary statutes. But they are passed as amendment in 
order to send a signal to the population, to the party bureaucracy and to the international 
community, to indicate that an important modification took place in the Party ideology 
and will take place in the society. This signaling mechanism seems innocent and notably 
without any legal and political consequences for the regime. Yet, the amendments, on 
one side, make visible a new equilibrium inside the CCP concerning very important 
questions both of ideology and policy-making. And - even more important – they confirm 
de facto the de jure distinction between constitutional norms and ordinary (statute) laws; 
putting the first stones towards the recognition of the importance of hierarchy of norms 
which is the starting point of the modern constitutionalism, We need to add that the 
Constitution integrates ex post the legal transformations rather than giving ex ante 
impulsion to new laws or to the protection of rights. Even if the coherence of the system 
is nowadays largely a wishful thinking, it seems nonetheless inevitable that a 
consciousness of the hierarchy of the norms is emerging in China. One should not forget 
that it took two century in France to move from the idea of hierarchy of norms to the 
practice of constitutional control.  
 
The CCP passed 4 sets of important constitutional amendments to the 1982 constitution. 
Up to 2004, constitutional amendments were concerned almost exclusively with the 
change of orthodoxy in economic matters: the diversification of property rights (1988), 
the establishment of a "socialist market economy" (1993), the acceptance "within the 
limits defined by the law and on the basis of strong State control, of the individual and 
semi-private economy" (Article 11, 1999) and the recognition of private property rights 
(March 2004). By stressing the value and concept of human rights, the amendment adds 
a new definition to the provisions concerning citizens’ rights in the current Constitution. 
                                                 
15 We borrow this expression from Andrea Pozas Loyo.   
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Although the concept of “citizens’ fundamental rights,” as described in the Constitution, is 
more definite in legal terms than that of human rights, regarding the subject and content, 
it has less influence in political terms. By adding the description that “the state respects 
and protects human rights” in the chapter of the Constitution concerning “the 
Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens”, the amendment combines the two concepts 
in an organic way, upgrading the essential meaning and value of the concept of citizens’ 
rights. 
The inclusion of human rights in the Constitution ushered in a new era of using the 
Constitution to safeguard human rights and opened up a wide window for the all-round 
development of human rights in China. Most of Chinese legal scholars object that such 
amendments are essentially of political nature and that the constitution is or ought to be 
a legal document. What the distinction does or should mean in that context? If by 
political decision one means minor questions connected with policymaking, no one can 
think that introducing “property rights” in the Chinese constitution, as it happened in 
2004, is a minor decision. More in general and concerning the question legal-political, C. 
Schmitt’s theory argues that a “constitution” (see his Verfassungslehre, 1928) has 
necessarily two sides: it is at same time a legal structure and a political decision. The 
fact that many liberal-democratic constitutions do not present themselves also as 
political decisions is not a reason to think that they are not such. Many written 
constitution includes clear choices and not just technical provisions about the 
organization of the government [examples from the French and the Italian present 
Constitution are republic, a-confessional state, etc.]. It seems moreover strange that 
NPC, meaning the CCP, willing to disregard the constitution no matter what, did pass in 
2000 a Lifa Fa (a Law on Legislation), which “provide[s] a means by which individuals 
can suggest the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) to 
check constitutionality and legality of some ordinary laws”.  
In China, the lack of respect for the Constitution is explained by the lack of a clear 
conception of the position of the Constitution in the hierarchy of the normative system, 
despite the apparently unambiguous terms used to designate it: it is indeed defined as 
the "fundamental law" (genben dafa) or as the "mother" of all the laws (mufa) with equal 
frequency. There are endless examples of the liberties taken with the text of the 
Constitution. For example, Article 28 of the Penal Law of 1997 (revised) replaces the 
term "counter-revolutionary activities" with the expression "penal activities which 
threaten the security of the State": this modification, however, was only integrated into 
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the Constitution when it was revised in 1999, two years later. Up to now, however, no 
revision of the constitution has institutionalized these new rules, even though they are in 
direct opposition to the "fundamental law" of the PRC.  
Interestingly, most of the Asian countries – with few exceptions, and most notable 
among them India – have the reputation of being countries where the constitution 
doesn’t matter. Countries with constitutions but without “constitutionalism” (T. Groppi). 
This document – a written constitution – which is nowadays one of the basic requirement 
to become a recognized member of the international community seems to be nothing 
more that a “parchment barrier” for political powers struggling with their transition to the 
promise land of democracy! China is a case in point because it seems to represent both 
the epitome of a political power without limits, and a country where the constitution can’t 
be more than a mockery. It is this apparent evidence, suggesting arguments in favor of 
the slightly unconventional hypothesis that the CCP takes, since almost 20 years the 
constitution growingly seriously.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In former Eastern block, in Mongolia, in Taiwan, Leninist parties played a dominant role 
in constitutional design of incremental reforms. Therefore while Stalinist legacies may 
play a path dependence role, it cannot prevent on the long run inner institutional reforms 
in China. Remains the fact that the Western development of the Rule of Law was 
marked by two forms of control of power, two irreversible and decisive victories which 
are: the verification of the legality of administrative action (and thus of the government) 
and the constitutional review. Now, both of these questions lie at the heart of 
contemporary evolutions in both the political and legal systems in China. As Philippe 
Schmitter put it “what counts is when and how these collective decisions about meta-
rules are made, debated, ratified and implemented more than what is in them”, as the 
process of choosing the institution is more important than the institution itself.  
The last century even more than the century of democracy has been the century of the 
universalisation of “rigid” constitutions. China is again a case in point since they have a 
rigid constitution but no democracy. The expression “rigid” constitution according to 
James Bryce and Hans Kelsen, refers to the legal quality of those norms that can’t be 
modified by the majority of the legislative power, but need a larger agreement, let say the 
involvement of the opposition in order to be amended. Rigid constitutions are in a sense 
Stéphanie Balme and Pasquale Pasquino - Taking Constitution(alism) seriously? … - January 2006 
http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org 
13
the ultimate defeat of the English-British model of Parliamentary sovereignty and victory 
of the model invented (or consecrated) in the US by the Philadelphia Convention in 
1787.  
 
The Rule of Law was forged over the course of the history of the countries of Europe. It 
is a body of "representations both of the State and of the Law", as Jacques Chevallier 
summarizes it. The theory of the Rule of Law is taking root in China in a soil which is 
very different not only from its founding historical context, but also from the political 
choices made since the end of the Cold War by the former regimes of the Communist 
bloc. In China today, as was to some extent the case in Europe in the past, and possibly 
particularly in France, the Rule of Law is a modern means of regulation, a tool in the 
service of the objective of rationalization of the State, here conceived by the single party 
in power. Thus, under the Ancien Regime, the philosophers of the Enlightenment 
sought, in the face of the theoreticians of Absolutism, to think through the political order 
rationally, from which there emerged the idea of the Social Contract. However the 
ideology which gave meaning to the Rule of Law stems from distrust of the State, whose 
power one always seeks to constrain and to supervise in order to protect the individual. 
Moreover, constitutional development has been based on a clear definition of the 
concept of law as defined as early as 1789 in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the citizen approved by the National Assembly at that time: “Law is the expression of the 
general will. Every citizen has a right to participate personally or through his 
representative in its foundation (…) All citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law are 
equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and occupations, according to 
them and without distinction except that of their virtues and talents”. Defining what is law 
means defining and deciding who has the power to draft, enact and vote laws. Such a 
power implies to delimit popular sovereignty, meaning also to take parliamentary 
sovereignty seriously. 
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